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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, an estimated 463,000 children are currently in
foster care.' Of these children, 123,000 (almost 30%) are eligible for
adoption. 2 The majority of these children are classified as having special
needs, meaning they are more difficult to place for adoption because of
their age; race; membership in a sibling group awaiting adoption; or
present physical, mental, or emotional handicap.3 Sadly, while other
healthy babies and young children have prospective parents waiting in
line to take them home, these special needs children may wait for an
adoptive family for years.4 Many will never find one.

1.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (HHS), TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE

AND ADOPTION (2009) [hereinafter TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION], available at

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearch/afcars/trends.htm.
HHS
distributes
information collected by the Adoption and Foster Care Reporting and Analysis System
(AFCARS); this reporting system uses the definition of "foster care" found in the Code of
Federal Regulations, where it is defined as "[tiwenty-four-hour substitute care for children
placed away from their parents or guardians and for whom the State agency has placement and
care responsibility." Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20 (2009).
2.

TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION, supra note 1. "Children waiting to be

adopted include children with a goal of adoption and whose parental rights have been
terminated." Id. Note, however, that for data collection purposes, "[c]hildren whose parents'
rights have been terminated, who are [sixteen] years old and older, and who have a goal of
emancipation" are excluded from the "waiting" population. Id.
3. H.R. REP. No. 107-064, at 13 (2001), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/cpquery/T?&report-hrO64&dbname=107& (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Each year, less than half of these children are adopted 6 and more
than 25,000 children "age out" of foster care (turn eighteen while still in
the protective custody of the state) without achieving permanent
placement. This lack of permanency can have enormous detrimental
effects on foster children, their communities, and the American public.
Early life experiences help determine the way a child thinks, learns, and
behaves for the rest of the child's life.8 Children who live through
sustained periods in foster care are at an increased risk for mental health
problems that may endure throughout their lives. Further, subjecting
children to multiple placements destroys continuities that are important
to their development. A child without a permanent home may suffer
from psychological problems,9 including lack of self-worth; failure to
form future relationships; and an inability to accept responsibility for
self, family, and community well-being.' 0
These psychological effects may explain the increased rate of
juvenile delinquency in foster children compared to such a rate in nonfoster children." Foster children have a greater number of delinquency
adjudications as minors and an increased rate of adult convictions. 12In
addition, because children who age out of the foster system lack a
permanent home, they may have inadequate financial or emotional
safety nets as they enter adulthood, leading to high unemployment rates
or employment in low-wage positions.' 3
6.

TRENDS INFOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION, supra note 1.

7.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COMING OF AGE: EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES

FOR YOUTH WHO AGE OUT OF FOSTER CARE THROUGH THEIR MIDDLE TWENTIEs 7 (2008),

availableat http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/fosteremp/index.html.
8. Marsha Garrison, Reforming ChildProtection:A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 590, 603 (2005).

9.
10.

Seeid. at 611 n.70.
Id.

11.

NAT'L SURVEY OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT WELLBEING (NSCAW), No. 1: WHO ARE

THE CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE?, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/abuse neglect/nscaw/
reports/childrenfostercare/childrenfostercare.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2010). See Joseph J.
Doyle, Jr., ChildProtection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects ofFoster Care,97 AM.
EcoN. REV. 1583, 1607 (2007), available at http://www.mit.edu/-jjdoyle/fostercare-aer.pdf;
Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Adult Crime: Using Investigator Assignment to
Estimate Casual Effects of FosterCare, 116 J. POL. EcoN. 746, 747 (2008) [hereinafter Doyle,
Child Protection and Adult Crime], availableat http://www.mit.edu/-jjdoyle/doylejpe aug08.
pdf. Nearly 20% of the U.S. prison population under the age of 30, and 25% of these prisoners
with prior convictions, report spending part of their childhood in foster care; studies have also
found higher rates of juvenile delinquency among foster children. Doyle, Child Protection &
Adult Crime, supra, at 747 n.3. Further, foster children are at high risks of other negative life
outcomes, including low educational attainment, substance abuse problems, and homelessness.
For example, an estimated 28% of the U.S. homeless population spent time in foster care as
children. Id.
12. See Doyle, Child ProtectionandAdult Crime, supra note 11, at 747.
13. See Garrison,supra note 8, at 603 n.45. Garrison states the following:
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In recognition of the detrimental effects that prolonged periods in
foster care may have on foster children and society, the federal
government began offering monetary incentives to increase the number
of children adopted from foster care by amending Internal Revenue
Code (I.R.C. or Code) § 23, commonly now known as the adoption tax
credit (the credit).14 The credit was nonrefundable, and its purpose was
to offset adoption costs, and to lessen financial barriers faced by
potential adoptive parents, with an emphasis placed on the adoption of
children from foster care.' 5 Although the amount of money available
under the credit was increased in 2001, this increase is set to expire on
December 31, 2010.16 Because the sunset date is approaching,
policymakers will soon decide whether to alter the current provisions or
to make them permanent. This Note will examine the effectiveness of
the credit, particularly in promoting the adoption of foster children, and
it will explore potential alternative taxation policies.

Children who remain in foster care until the age of majority ... exhibit a wide
range of profoundly dysfunctional behaviors. A national study of the Title IV-E
foster care independent living program, which is supposed to assist foster
children in the transition to self-sufficiency, found that, thirty months to four
years after aging out of the system, forty-six percent of those surveyed had not
completed high school, thirty-eight percent had not held a job for longer than
one year, twenty-five percent had been homeless for at least one night, sixty
percent of women had given birth to a child, and forty percent had been on
public assistance, incarcerated, or a cost to the community in some other way.

Id. at 603. See Madelyn Freundlich, N. Am. Council on Adoptable Children, The Value of
Adoption Subsidies: Helping Children Find Permanent Families (2008), available at
http://www.nacac.org/adoptionsubsidy/valueofsubsidies.pdf
14. I.R.C. § 23 (2009). This statute was reclassified as refundable as of March 23, 2010,
and transferred to Subpart C. See I.R.C. § 36(c). In May 2008, Florida responded to this problem
by launching its "Explore Adoption" campaign. As part of the campaign, Florida Governor
Charlie Crist made increased adoption awareness and the well-being of all Florida children a
priority, and created the Office of Adoption and Child Protection to establish a comprehensive
statewide approach for promoting adoption. Fla. Office of Adoption & Child Prot. Annual
Report (2008), available at http://www.flgov.com/pdfs/ChildAdvocacy/oacpannualreport2008.
pdf.
15. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L.
No. 107-16, § 202, 115 Stat. 38, 47-49 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
(2001)).
16. Id.; see infra notes 171 and 172 for the amended sunset provisions.
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II. OPERATION OF THE ADOPTION TAx CREDIT

A. History of the Credit-The Adoption Promotionand Stability
Act of 1996
In 1996, Congress introduced the Adoption Promotion and Stability
Act (the Act) to help families "defray adoption costs."17 A report issued
by the Committee on Ways and Means states the reason for the
legislation: "[T]he financial costs of the adoption process should not be
a barrier to adoptions. In addition, the Committee wishes to further
encourage the adoption of special needs children."' 8 The Act was
ultimately subsumed into section 1807 of the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996 (SBJPA).' 9
At the time of its passage, SBJPA introduced a nonrefundable tax
credit of $6,000 for adoptive parents of children with special needs, and
a nonrefundable tax credit of $5,000 for the adoptive parents of all other
children.20 A child was considered to have special needs if a state
determined that (1) the child could not or should not be returned to the
parental home, and (2) that a specific factor existed (such as age, ethnic
background, or membership in a sibling group) that warranted the
state's assistance in placing the child with adoptive parents.2 1 SBJPA
also included an income eligibility phase-out range beginning at an
annual adjusted gross income (AGI) of $75,000, and completely
phasing out for an AGI of $115,000 or more. 22

17. H.R. REP. No. 104-542, pt. 2, at 38 (1996), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong reports&docid=f:hr542p2.104.pdf.
18. Id at 17.
19. Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1807, 110 Stat. 1755,
1899-1903 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671, 674, 1996b (1996)).
20. Id. § 1807. An eligible child, whether classified as special needs or not, must be under
eighteen years old, or be physically or mentally incapable of caring for himself or herself. Id. §
1807.
21. Id. § 1807. U.S. citizenship or residency was (and continues to be) required for
qualification as a special needs child. Id. § 1807; I.R.C. § 23(d)(3)(C) (2009). The adoption
classification in Florida illustrates state-specific criteria; Florida requires a child to have one of
the following conditions for a special needs determination: of age eight or older,
developmentally disabled, physically or emotionally handicapped, part of a sibling group being
placed together, or black or bi-racial. FLORIDA'S "EXPLORE ADOPTION" CAMPAIGN FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONs, http://www.adoptflorida.org/about5.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
22. Small Business Job Protection Act § 1807.
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B. Mechanics of the Tax Benefits Establishedby the Economic Growth
and Tax ReliefReconciliationAct
1. Current Structure of I.R.C. § 23
Citing the success of SBJPA in reducing the costs of adoption,
Congress passed the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act (EGTRRA) in 2001 to "encourage more adoptions and allow more
families to afford adoption." 23 In an effort to promote congressional
goals, EGTRRA increased the tax credit available under I.R.C. § 23 for
all qualified 24 adoption-related expenses up to $10,000, including those
related to adoptions of special needs children.25 Beginning in 2002,
23. H.R. REP. No. 107-064, at 5 (2001).
24. The Code defines qualifying expenses to include reasonable and necessary adoption
fees, court costs, attorney fees, traveling expenses (including amounts spent for meals and
lodging while away from home), and other expenses directly related to and for which the
principal purpose is the legal adoption of an eligible child. I.R.C. § 23(d)(1) (2009). Qualifying
expenses exclude expenses connected to the adoption of a step-child and any reimbursed
expenses, such as those reimbursed under an employer program. Id. § 23(d)(1). For qualifying
expenses paid prior to the year the adoption becomes final, the credit generally is allowed for
the year following the year of payment, including cases of failed adoptions. Id. § 23(a)(2). An
exception exists for the adoption of children who are not U.S. citizens or residents; the credit
cannot be claimed for expenses relating to foreign adoptions that are not finalized. Id. § 23(e). A
taxpayer who paid qualifying expenses in the current year for an adoption which became final in
the current year may be eligible to claim the credit for the expenses on the current year return, in
addition to credit for expenses paid in a prior year. Id. § 23(a)(2). Although the adoption credit
is not available for any reimbursed expenses, I.R.C. § 23(b)(3)(A) (2009), amounts paid by a
taxpayer's employer for qualifying adoption expenses are excludable from the taxpayer's gross
income. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 202, 115 Stat. 38, 47-49 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
(2001)); I.R.C. § 137(a) (2009). Under EGTRRA, the amount of tax-free employer adoption
assistance is the amount of qualified adoption expenses up to $10,000, indexed for inflation and
subject to the same phase-out restrictions as I.R.C. § 23. I.R.C. § 137(a),(b),(f) (2009); I.R.C. §
23 (2009). If a taxpayer is eligible to claim the credit and the exclusion, the taxpayer may claim
both, and the limitation applies separately to each. I.R.C., Topic 607-ADOPTON CREDIT (2009),
availableat http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc607.html.
25. The term child with special needs means any child if(A) a State has determined that the child cannot or should not be returned to the
home of his parents,
(B) such State has determined that there exists with respect to the child a
specific factor or condition (such as his ethnic background, age, or membership
in a minority or sibling group, or the presence of factors such as medical
conditions or physical, mental, or emotional handicaps) because of which it is
reasonable to conclude that such child cannot be placed with adoptive parents
without providing adoption assistance, and
(C) such child is a citizen or resident of the United States ....
I.R.C.

§ 23 (d)(3) (2009). See supra text accompanying note 21.
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EGTRRA raised the phase-out range to AGIs of $150,000-$190,000.26
Further, under EGTRRA, if a taxpayer lacks the tax liability to claim
the full credit, the unused portion of the credit can be carried forward
for an additional five years.
2. Amendments to Increase Accessibility to the Credit
In 2003, the credit became more accessible to families adopting
children with special needs.28 Out of concern that EGTRRA would do
too "little to promote the adoption of the many special needs children in
foster care," the Act mandated that, beginning in 2003, families
adopting a special needs child would not need to document "qualified"
adoption-related expenses in order to claim the credit. 30 Thus, adoptive
parents whose income satisfies the phase-out requirements can claim the
full credit without documenting that they incurred a specific level of
qualified expenses.3 '
This provision was a significant step toward breaking down the
barriers to the adoption of foster children. 32 In a report to the House of
Representatives, the Committee on Ways and Means indicated that
while parents who adopt privately or internationally (foreign adoptions)
can easily document adoption-related expenses, parents adopting from
public agencies face difficulties in documenting "qualified" expenses.3 3
Parents who adopt privately, whether through domestic or foreign
adoptions, typically incur significant agency fees, travel expenses, and
attorneys' fees, which are easily reported. 3-However, costs for home
studies and agency fees for parents adopting children from foster care
are often waived or reimbursed through the nonrecurring costs

26. I.R.C. § 23(b)(2) (2009). Both the tax credit and income limitations were indexed for
inflation. I.R.C. § 23(h) (2009). For taxable years beginning in 2009, the credit allowed is
$12,150. I.R.C. § 23(b)(1), (h) (2009). The 2009 phase-range begins for taxpayers with AGIs in
excess of $182,180, and the credit is completely phased out for taxpayers with AGIs of
$222,180 or more. I.R.C. § 23(b)(2), (h) (2009).
27. I.R.C. § 23(c) (2009).
28. I.R.C. § 23(a)(3) (2009).
29. H.R. REP. No. 107-064, at 13 (2001).
30. I.R.C. § 23(a)(3) (2009).
31. Id.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 107-064, at 13 (2001). See also ROB GREEN, CHILD TRENDS, THE
ADOPTION TAx CREDIT: IS IT AN EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO PROMOTE FOSTER CARE ADOPTION? 1,

5 (2007), available at http://www.childtrends.org/Files//Child Trends-2007_08_07_RB_
AdoptionTaxCredit.pdf (stating that the number of adoptions from foster care supported by the
credit more than doubled between 2002 and 2003 after Congress removed the requirement of
documenting expenses).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 107-064, at 13 (2001).
34. See id.
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provisions of states' adoption assistance programs.3 5 The latter
adoption-related costs are more likely to include housing modifications,
and ongoing medical and counseling services, none of which are
qualified adoption-related expenses as defined by the Code provision.
3. Amount of Credit Claimed by Taxpayers and Resultant
Foregone Revenue
In its Report to Congress on Tax Benefits for Adoption, the
Department of the Treasury stated that, in tax year 1998, adoptive
parents of only 15% of eligible special needs children applied for the
credit.3 7 Of the few families adopting special needs children who
benefited from the credit, 71% reported expenses under the current
$6,000 limit for eligible expenses incurred in connection with a special
needs adoption. 38 Further, in 1998, special needs adoptions accounted
for only 8% of the total credit taken, and such families3 enerated about
$3,500 in qualified adoption expenses per adoption. Thus, simply
raising the limit on eligible expenses to $10,000 would have done little
to help parents adopt special needs children. Moreover, some members
of Congress viewed the elimination of the documentation requirement
as a necessary step toward reaching the goal of obtaining permanency
for foster children.o
In its 2001 Report to the House, the Congressional Budget Office
and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the EGTRRA
provisions allowing the adoption credit and exclusion for employerreimbursed expenses would cause the following government revenue
losses:4 1 $47 million in fiscal year 2002, by $973 million over the 20022006 period, and by approximately $2.6 billion over the 2002-2011
the Joint Committee on Taxation
period. 42 For 2009-2010, specifically, 43
estimates $800 million in lost revenue.

35.
36.

See id. at 4, 13.
See id. at 13; I.R.C.

37.

U.S. TREASURY REP., TAx BENEFITS FOR ADOPTION 2 (2000), availableat http://www.

§ 23(a)(3) (2009).

treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/adoption.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 107-064, at 13 (2001).
41.

Id. at 7.

42.

Id.

43.

STAFF OF J. CoMm. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FED. TAx EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL

YEARS 2008-2012, at 55 (2008), availableat http://www.jct. gov/s-2-08.pdf.
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4. Comparison with Federal Spending for Foster Care
While the tax credit has resulted in over $1 billion in lost revenue,
this amount is far less than what federal government spends on foster
care. According to the Department of Health and Human Services,
foster care funding represents 65% of the federal funds dedicated to
child welfare programs. Federal spending for foster care for fiscal year
2008 was approximately $4.5 billion, with similar estimates for 2009
and 2010.45 Because an increase in the number of children adopted from
foster care has the potential to decrease the amount of foster care
funding, the credit ma' help offset the cost of foster care, making it
well worth the expense.
C. Sunset ofEGTRRA Provisions
Unless further legislation is enacted, the EGTRRA provision that
increased the amount of money that adoptive families may claim, as
well as the provision that increased the income eligibility phase-out
range, will sunset on December 31, 2010.47 Thus, beginning in 2011,
the adoption credit allowance will decrease to the SBJPA (preEGTRRA) level 48 of $6,000 per special needs child and $5,000 per nonspecial needs child. 49 Additionally, adoptive families reporting $75,000$115,000 in AGI will again be restricted in the amount they may claim,
and those reporting more than $115,000 will be prohibited from
claiming any credit amount.so
Congress has introduced several bills that would repeal the sunset
and make the EGTRRA reforms of the adoption tax credit permanent.
Most recently, legislators proposed the Adoption Tax Relief Guarantee
Act of 2009, which would make the credit permanent.5 On January 6,
44.

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FEDERAL FOSTER CARE FINANCING: How

AND WHY THE CURRENT FUNDING STRUCTURE FAILS TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE CHILD

WELFARE FIELD 2 (2005), availableat http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/05/fc-financing-ib/ib.pdf.
45.

CHILD

WELFARE LEAGUE

OF

AMERICA,

FUNDING

FOR SELECTED

CHILDREN'S

PROGRAMS 1 tbl. 1 (2009), availableat http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/budgetdetails09.htm.
46. See H.R. REP.No. 107-064, at 14 (2001).
47. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L.
No. 107-16 § 901, 115 Stat. 38, 150 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
(2001)).
48. Id. § 901.
49. Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755, 1899
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671, 674, 1996b (1996)).
50. Id. § 1807.
51. Adoption Tax Relief Guarantee Act of 2009, H.R. 213, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ bill.xpd?bill=hl l-213 (exempting provisions
expanding the adoption tax credit and adoption assistance programs enacted by EGTRRA from
the general terminating provisions).
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2009, the bill was referred to the House Committee on Ways and
Means, where it has remained without enactment. 52

HI.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CREDIT AT PROMOTING THE
ADOPTION OF CHILDREN FROM FOSTER CARE

A. DistributionalIssues
With the sunset date on the horizon, recent debate has focused on the
effectiveness of the credit at promoting adoptions of foster children.
Unfortunately, no data is currently available that specifical1y evaluates
the credit's effect on one's ability or decision to adopt. However,
preliminary research shows a significant and positive correlation
between a state's level of financial assistance for adoptive parents and
its rate of adoptions from foster care. 54 In particular, studies suggest that
increased subsidies to adoptive parents increased the number of
adoptions.5 5 If direct, state subsidies to parents in the form of monthly
adoption assistance payments increase the adoption rate for children in
foster care, then by analogy, the federal subsidy provided by the credit
should also have a positive effect.5 6
Although research for the credit's effect on the decision to adopt is
57
lacking, statistics for distribution of the credit are available.
Encouraging data suggest that adoptive parents are taking greater
advantage of the credit, whether they adopt children through private or
foreign adoptions, or from foster care. 5 8 There has been a substantial
52. H.R. 213. In January 2005, a similar bill was introduced to make permanent the
expansion of the credit as introduced in EGTRRA. Adoption Tax Relief Guarantee Act of 2005,
S. 246, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=sl09-246. The bill had strong support in the House, gaining seventy-four
representative co-sponsors, but it later failed in the Senate. Id. Thus, much speculation exists
concerning the fate of the current bill.
53. See Freundlich,supra note 13.
54. Id. at 3.
55. See id But see Gopi Shah Goda & Kevin J. Mumford, FertilityResponse to the Tax
Treatment of Children 28 (Purdue Univ. Krannert Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1219,
2009), available at http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/programs/phd/Working-paper-series/Year2009/1219.pdf (studying the effect of the child tax credit on fertility rates and finding that
overall estimates of the fertility response to child tax benefits are statistically insignificant;
however, authors note concerns related to the analysis utilized and urge caution in applying their
results).
56. See Freundlich, supra note 13, at 5.
57.

U.S. TREASURY REP., FEDERAL INcOME TAX BENEFITS FOR ADOPTION: USE BY

TAXPAYERS 1999-2005, at 1, 7 tbl.1 (2007), available at http://www.fosteringconnections.org/
tools/assets/files/AdoptionTaxCreditStudy2007-1.pdf.
58. Id.
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increase in the amount of money spent on the adoption tax credit, as
well as in the amount of unused credit carried forward.59 The total
amount of tax benefits received more than tripled between 1999 and
2005, from $103 million to $355 million.o Over the same period, the
amount of unused credit carried forward increased over 400%, from $82
million to $414 million.61
Although the amount of adoption tax credit dollars received by
adoptive parents increased dramatically, more than 82% of the total
dollars spent went toward supporting children adopted privately or from
foreign countries.62 On a national level, the number of children adopted
from foster (are has remained virtually unchanged since 2000; between
2000 and 2005, the number of foster children adopted increased by only
1%.63 During the same period, foreign adoptions increased by 28%.6
Data suggests that the tax credit, as it is currently structured, is not
meeting its original goal of promoting adoptions from foster care. 65 Of
primary concern is the small number of adoptions from foster care
supported by the credit compared to private adoptions.6 6 In 2004,
private adoptions accounted for almost half of the children supported by
the credit and 38% of the dollars spent. 67 Foreign adoptions accounted
for just over a third of the children supported and 45% of the dollars
spent. Foster children accounted for only 18% of the children
supported and 17% of dollars spent. 69 Thus, the vast majority of
adoption tax credit recipients completed private or foreign adoptions
rather than adoptions from foster care.7 0 Further, almost all foreign
adoptions benefited from the tax credit, compared to only
approximately 25% of foster care adoptions. 7 ' These numbers suggest
that although Congress furthered its objective of lessening financial
barriers for adoptions generally, the credit has not achieved its goal
regarding foster children. 72

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
Id.
GREEN, supra note 32, at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id at 4-5.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4-5.
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Another concern is that the credit disproportionately supports higherincome families." In 2005, $355 million was claimed in allowable
adoption tax credits. 74 Of this amount, approximately two-thirds were
received by tax filers with incomes of $75,000 or greater. 75 Family
76
income also tends to correlate with the type of adoption. Foreign
adoptions accounted for almost half of adoptions completed by filers
with incomes above $100,000, perhaps because waiting periods may be
shorter for foreign adoptions than for private domestic adoptions, and
this income group can afford the higher cost associated with some
foreign adoptions. 7 Further, foster care adoptions accounted for only
10% of the adoptions completed by filers with incomes over
$100,000.7 Most notably, when comparing types of adoptions by
income group, adoptive families with incomes less than $25,000
adopted a greater percentage of children from foster care relative to
private and foreign adoptions than any other income group.7 9
B. PotentialSources of the Disparitiesin Distribution
1. Awareness of the Availability of the Credit
The North American Council of Adoptive Children (NACAC)
partially attributes the low rate of credit claimed by those adopting
special needs children to a lack of awareness of the credit.8 0 In 2008,
Congress sought to address this concern by enacting the Fostering
Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act.8 This Act added
a new requirement that states must inform individuals adopting or
considering adopting a child from foster care of their potential
eligibility for the credit. 82
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id tbl.2.
77. See id. at 2-3.
78. Id. at 2.
79. See id. tbl.2. Adoptions from foster care accounted for 29% of the adoptions by
families with incomes under $25,000, compared with 26% of adoptions by families with
incomes of $25,000-49,999, 20% of the $50,000-74,999 income group, 16% of the $75,00099,999 income group, 11% of the $100,000-155,860 income group, 8% of the $155,860195,860 income group, and only 4% of families with incomes of $195,860 or greater. Id. See
U.S. TREASURY REP., supra note 57, at 8 tbl.1999-1.
80. N. AM. COUNCiL ON ADOPTABLE CHILDREN, New FederalLaw Overhauls U.S. Child
Welfare Financing(2008), availableat http://www.nacac.org/policy/hr6893summary.html.
81. See Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-351, § 403, 122 Stat. 3949 (2008) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2008)).
82. N. AM. COUNCIL ON ADOPTABLE CHILDREN, supra note 80. Data has not yet been
compiled to assess the value of the legislation, which is discouraging given EGTRRA's
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2. Effect of Income on Credit Availability
The low income level of many families adopting foster children
creates a significant barrier to accessing the credit. Families with
incomes less than $25,000 comprise the income group with the greatest
percentage of adoptions from foster care compared to private and
foreign adoptions. Generally, these families do not have the requisite
tax liability to claim the full value of the credit.85 Increasing awareness
of the availability of the credit may enable more higher-income families
to benefit from it, but raising public awareness will have no effect on
families incapable of claiming the credit due to their insufficient tax
liability. 6 Because of this impediment, some adoption advocacy groups
have campaigned for the transfer of the credit into a refundable credit,
paid fully to families adopting foster children.8 7

IV. TAx POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Because EGTRRA's sunset date is approaching, analysis of the
adoption credit is necessary to determine whether the current provisions
should be altered or made permanent. The adoption tax credit is clearly
not fulfilling its primary goal of promoting adoption from foster care.
Thus, this Note will address policy alternatives to the current tax credit.
The analysis will focus on the concept of tax expenditures as advanced
by Professor Stanley Surrey, and it will also discuss several objections
to the tax expenditure analysis. This examination will reveal that
transforming the current credit into a refundable credit is a favorable
alternative.
A. Tax ExpenditureAnalysis
An initial query is whether the congressional goal of promoting
adoptions, particularly special needs adoptions such as the adoption of
foster children, is furthered more effectively by the use of a tax credit,
as opposed to other means. Perhaps taxpayer dollars would be better
spent on direct government programs that could encourage recruitment
upcoming sunset date. Analysis of the Act's usefulness could aid Congress in determining
whether EGTRRA's shortcomings in promoting adoptions from foster care could be rectified by
increased awareness, in lieu of revision to the current credit allowance or reversion to its preEGTRRA design.
83.

GREEN, supra note 32, at 5.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 2 tbl.2.
Id. at 5.
Id.
See id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAWAND PUBLIC POLICY

214

[Vol. 21

of adoptive parents, offer medical services to adoptive families, or
provide cash payments to adoptive families. Professor Surrey laid the
foundation for such an inquiry under the theory of tax expenditures.
1. Defining "Tax Expenditures" and "Tax Incentives"
Tax provisions such as the adoption credit under I.R.C. § 23 are
identified as "tax expenditures" by the Treasury and by Congress.8 8
These expenditures are categorized as spending provisions of the Code,
in the form of foregone revenue, rather than as revenue-raising
provisions.8 9 Such expenditures are defined under the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Act as "those revenue losses attributable to
provisions of the federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion,
exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special
credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability."9 This
definition stems from Professor Surrey's tax policy analysis. Professor
Surrey separated tax provisions into two groups: (1) the "structural"
provisions necessary to implement a normal income tax, and (2) the
"special preference" provisions favoring a particular activity or class of

individuals. 9 1
Under Surrey's analysis, provisions are identifiable as tax
expenditures because they achieve a specified purpose other than the
measurement of net income, and "represent government expenditures
made through that system to achieve various social and economic
objectives." Surrey further separated Code provisions by dividing tax
88. Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1155
(1988). The Treasury published its first tax expenditure analysis in 1968 when Stanley Surrey
served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, at 18 (2008), available at

http://www.jct.gov/x-37-08.pdf.
89. Id.
90. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3, 88
Stat. 297, 299 (codified as 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688 (1974)).
91. Eric Zolt, Deterrencevia Taxation: A CriticalAnalysis of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37
UCLA L. REv. 343, 346 (1989) (citing STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE
CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973)). Using Surrey's approach, structural provisions define

net income and specify accounting periods, rate schedules, and exemption levels. Id. Special
preference provisions include exemptions, exclusions, preferential tax rates, deductions, and
credits against tax. Id. at 346-47. In Surrey's effort to differentiate tax expenditures, he began
with the Haig-Simons definition of income. The Haig-Simons approach taxes an individual on
the sum of (1) the market value of rights exercising consumption and (2) the change in value of
property rights between the beginning and end of a time period. Id. at 347 n.19. Surrey then
adjusted for .'generally accepted' concepts of taxation, such as nontaxation of unrealized gains,
exclusion of imputed income from owner-occupied homes, and certain standard financial
accounting practices." Id. at 347 (citing SURREY, supra). All variations from this base line that
benefited taxpayers were considered tax expenditures. Id.
92. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
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expenditures into two groups, those identified as tax incentives, and
those not identified as such. 93 He defined "tax incentives" as tax
expenditures that induce certain behavior "in response to the monetary
benefit available." 94 In contrast, tax expenditures that are not tax
incentives but merely normative provisions, such as those designed to
provide tax relief for those with physical handicaps and other Fersonal
hardship, are related to the involuntary behavior of taxpayers. Under
this analysis, the credit can be considered a tax incentive, because its
purpose is to provide monetary assistance through the Code to make
adoption financially "more palatable" to taxpayers, and thus induce
them to adopt. 96
According to Surrey, the social goals of tax incentives are similar in
nature to those of direct government expenditures, such as interest
subsidies, direct federal loans, and federal grants.9 7 Surrey's approach
was presumably a response to the tendency of policymakers to utilize
the Code as a replacement for direct government spending.9 8 The term
"tax expenditure" may have been chosen to suggest that these tax
provisions are equivalent to direct government spending programs, but
are utilized through the Code. 99
Under Surrey's analysis, tax expenditures may be viewed as mere
substitutes for direct government assistance programs. 00 For example,
tax credits given to adoptive parents may be a substitute for programs
designed to offer families post-adoptive care, such as programs that
provide free counseling services or programs that direct cash
assistance.101

2. Challenges to the Tax Incentive Analysis
Some opponents of the tax incentive analysis argue that Surrey's basic
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705, 706 (1970).
93. See id. at 711.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 712.
96. Id. at 713.
97. Id.
98. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 TEx. L. REv. 973, 978 (1986).
99. Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of Employment-Related
Child-CareExpenditures, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 379 (1998) (citing SURREY, supra note

91).
100. See Zelinsky, supra note 98, at 978.
101. See id As another example, tax credits given to employers for hiring the "chronically
unemployed" may be a substitute for a system of direct cash payments from the government to
the employers. Id. Similarly, tax credits given to adoptive parents may be a substitute for
programs designed to offer families post-adoptive care, such as by providing free counseling
services, or direct cash assistance programs. Id.
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premise is unusable.102 These opponents reason that it is not possible to
classify provisions as either "normative" or "incentive" because one
taxpayer's incentive is another's "normative deduction."' 0 3 Professor
Edward Zelinsky cites several examples of provisions that could be
described as tax incentives but could equally be classified as normative
provisions.104 For example, the childcare costs of a working parent
could be treated as nondeductible personal expenses or as deductible
business-related expenses. 05 Thus, the premise of tax incentive
analysis-"the existence of an ideal, normative tax against which to
measure expenditure-type deviations"-is flawed because it disregards
"value-laden choices inherent in the design of an income tax."l 06
Regardless of its opposition, Surrey's concept of tax incentives has
This discussion will
become a central instrument in tax analysis.
utilize his framework for analyzing which approach-use of tax
incentives or direct spending-is the better vehicle to promote the
adoption of special needs children.
B. Use of Tax Expenditures as Substitutesfor Direct
Government Spending
1. Upside-Down Effect-Inequitable Effects of Tax Incentives
Inherent in the use of tax incentives, such as the adoption credit, is
the notion that "the better off the taxpayer, the greater the financial
benefit." 08 Nonrefundable tax credits typically offer the greatest benefit
to taxpayers in the highest marginal tax bracket allowed under the
credit, because these individuals have the requisite tax liability to claim
the credit, and are also more likely to seek the aid of tax preparers to
ensure that all available tax benefits are utilized.109 Thus, those who
may need the assistance the most are less likely to receive it, resulting in
distributional unfairness and the "upside-down" effect of tax
expenditures."l 0 Direct spending programs are rarely, if ever, structured
in the same manner, and are generally equally accessible by individuals

102. Id. at 978.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 979.
105. Id.; see Fellows, supra note 99, at 375. Similarly, moving costs for the relocation of
an entire family arising from one parent's job offer in another location could be classified as
nondeductible personal expenses or as business expenses. See Zelinsky, supra note 98, at 979.
106. See Zelinsky, supra note 98, at 979.
107. See id. at 978.
108. STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 108 (1985).
109. See id.
110. See id.
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with lower incomes."'
Further, because the credit itself is not included in income, the
incentive provides both financial assistance and tax relief.11 2 According
to Professor Surrey, this benefit is another form of tax incentive that has
the same upside-down effect as the original incentive.113 This freedom
from tax provides a greater benefit to taxpayers in higher brackets than
to those with less income and correspondingly less tax liability.' 14 Thus,
the distributional inequity is compounded.'
2. Tax Incentives-Encouragement of Private Decision-Making
The underlying upside-down effect of tax incentives is more
tolerable when considered alongside the advantages that incentives may
provide over direct government spending. Tax incentives may be
preferable because they promote individual decision-making, unlike
direct expenditures, which seemingly result from government decisionmaking.1 6 Private decision-making, including the use of private
initiative and capital, may be aimed toward socially useful projects.
Thus, tax incentives may more effectively encourage individuals to
solve social problems.117
However, direct expenditure programs can also be designed to allow
for flexibility and individual decision-making." 8 Surrey cites the
charitable contribution deduction as an example." 9 Because the
taxpayer selects the charity and determines the amount of the gift, the
taxpayer has control of her spending. 120 However, a direct expenditure
program could be structured similarly; the taxpayer could choose a
charity, decide on an amount to give, and the government could match
the donation, thus preserving private decision-making.121 Similarly, in
lieu of the credit, the government could offer free support services to
adoptive families, such as counseling and medical services provided by
facilities of the families' choice. Or, for maximum flexibility, the credit
could be transformed into a direct government grant in the form of a
refundable credit.
However, the freedom of choice associated with tax incentives is not
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id.
Surrey, supra note 92, at 723.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 718.
Id
Id.
Id. at 719.
Id.
Id.
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equally associated with direct spending programs. Tax incentives are
designed to openly encourage private decision-making, which is
consistent with American principles of free enterprise and individual
choice.122 Taxpayers are able to determine their own eligibility, and
because individuals do not have to apply for the government funds
directly, the eligibility choice given to taxpayers could have a
Due to the negative connotations
significant psychological effect.
associated with the receipt of direct assistance, as opposed to the receipt
of "tax" benefits, taxpayers may be less likely to seek direct
assistance. 124
According to Surrey, this view is "sheer illusion;" regardless of
whether government funds are spent through a direct program or a tax
incentive, "the fact remains that the funds come from government."' 25
However, Surrey acknowledges that the government may use tax
incentives to "foster the illusion" that private individuals are making
spending decisions.126 If, as Surrey suggests, this illusion is effective at
masking the government's true spending role and thus less likely to face
attack by taxpayers, perhaps tax incentives provide an actual benefit by
increasing the likelihood that the assistance will be offered and utilized.
Those who oppose this concept point to the danger inherent when
government actions lack visibility. Unlike direct spending programs,
which are quick to attract attention, tax expenditures are "largely
invisible."12 Thus, policymakers who "do not want to appear to be big
spenders can comfortably approve tax expenditures without damaging
their images of fiscal conservatism." 2 8 Further, policymakers may
prefer the "hidden subsidy" over the "open subsidy" out of fear that
once the public is aware of the cost involved and can weigh the costs
against benefits received by the tax incentive, the public will disfavor
the incentive.129 But this potential feature of tax incentives cannot be
considered a positive attribute. 130 If a goal of government expenditures
is to allocate limited funds where they can best be served, either by
direct spending or through tax relief, such invisibility cannot be viewed

122. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 108, at 100.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 104.
128. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
129. See Surrey, supra note 92, at 733-34. According to Surrey, "[tihe deeper the incentive
is buried in tax technicalities and tax terminology, the more it looks like any other technical tax
provision, [and] .. . the more desirable the tax incentive becomes. The public must dig hard and
deep to find the subsidy and evaluate it." Id. at 734.
130. See id.
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as furthering this cause.131
3. Windfall Effect of Tax Incentives
Those opposed to tax incentives also argue that they are wasteful
because a number of tax benefits are given to taxpayers for behaving the
way they would have behaved without the benefit.132 Thus the tax
incentive is a windfall to the taxpayer and does not stimulate the
behavior desired by the government.
The windfall effect is likely demonstrated in the operation of the
credit, particularly in private and foreign adoptions, where the bulk of
adoptive families are middle- to high-income taxpayers.134 Because the
majority of individuals wishing to privately adopt are financially
capable of paying the expenses without additional assistance,
government spending lacks the desired effect of influencing behavior.
However, direct expenditure programs are also open to this
criticism. 3 5 Surrey uses contract payments made to employers hiring
unskilled employees as an example; these payments may be given to
employers who would have hired the employees without the
expenditure program.136 The same would be true of direct spending
programs to aid adoptive families. Families provided with free or
reduced support services may have sought the services regardless of the
price tag associated with them. Thus, the windfall effect can be
considered a negative attribute of both tax incentives and direct
expenditures.
4. Superior Expertise of Direct Expenditure Organizations
Under Surrey's analysis, direct spending programs are preferable to
tax incentives in part because they are created and administered by
individuals and agencies familiar with program objectives.13 7 Such
programs are generally analyzed by the congressional committee
charged with the particular area of expertise. 3 8 i contrast, tax
legislation is analyzed by the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee, committees typicall " not involved in the
substantive areas of proposed tax incentives. 9 Although these
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at 719.
Id.
GREEN, supra note 32, at 2 tbl.2.
Surrey, supra note 92, at 719.
Id.
SuRREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 108, at 106.
See Surrey, supra note 92, at 728.
Id.
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committees are "highly competent in tax matters, they do not have as
much insight into these programs as the legislative committees normally
handling the programs. A similar situation would prevail if the latter
committees were suddenly to legislate on technical tax matters." 40 The
time and expense associated with ensuring that the committees are
adequately informed add to the administrative cost of the incentive, and
if sufficient information is not obtained, potentially decrease the
effectiveness of the proposed legislation.141
However, Zelinsky offers a contrary view. He argues that even if
direct expenditure organizations possess superior expertise "in the
abstract," the organizations are less likely than tax groups to make
decisions "actually informed by such expertise."l42 This is due to the
influence of interest groups on direct expenditure institutions. 143
Because tax policymakers are subject to "more numerous and diverse
constituencies than the specialized, limited-clientele organizations that
design and implement direct government spending," they are less
susceptible to, and dependent on, information provided by any
particular lobbyist group.'" Thus, although tax policymakers may
possess inferior expertise in a substantive area, they are "better able to
make decisions informed b the expertise they do possess" without
interference from lobbyists.
While the soundness of this analysis is debatable, as interest groups
seem to permeate all levels of government, it may reduce the
importance of the superior expertise of direct expenditure institutions in
tax expenditure analysis. This may be particularly true when considered
in combination with recent technological advancements and the current
ease of sharing information. Becoming knowledgeable in a specific area
is considerably less time- and cost-consuming than it was forty years
ago.
140. Id
141. See id at 728-29. A lack of expertise may also be seen at the administrative level.
Social programs are normally administered by executive departments specializing in the area
involved; tax collection is administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), whose expertise
is generally limited to tax matters. Because tax expenditures burden the IRS with administrative
and enforcement responsibilities "outside of its traditional revenue collection function,"
implementing new tax incentives is often more costly, and potentially less effective, than
projected. Mary Heen, Congress, Public Values, and the Financingof Private Choice, 65 OHIo
ST. L.J. 853, 911 (2004). Thus, under this analysis, efficient use of government funds aimed at
promoting adoption would entail placing federal programs supporting adoptive families under
the control and supervision of agencies familiar with their needs.
142. Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A
ProceduralDefense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165, 1185-86
(1993).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1166.
145. Id.at 1186.
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5. Comparative Simplicity of Tax Incentives
Because tax incentives do not require the government to collect and
then redistribute funds to the same degree that direct spending programs
do, proponents of incentives argue that administration costs are far
lower than the cost of direct spending programs.146 Tax incentives are
administered through an established framework; the Code is viewed as
an effective mechanism already in place.147 Thus, unlike the
establishment of direct spending programs, tax incentives do not require
new systems of administration, thereby reducing government costs.148
Further, because tax incentives operate through the Code instead of
through an array of varied government agencies, incentives require less
government supervision, less bureaucracy, and less red tape.149
However, numerous Code provisions which are considered tax
incentives, such as I.R.C. § 23, are highly complex and can create
problems for taxpayers and administrators. o These incentives involve
complicated schedules and individuals often require the assistance of
professional tax preparers to take full advantage of the benefit.' 5 '
Complicated eligibility requirements for receiving certain tax
incentives, including the adoption credit, add to the complexities and
potential confusion associated with the tax incentive approach.152 Each
tax incentive is also an "additional item to be audited," increasing the
cost of administration. 53 Thus, tape is often present in tax incentive
programs, "and its color [is] red."' 5
C. Policy Alternatives-Refundable Tax Credit
One approach to mitigating certain negative attributes of tax
incentives, including the upside-down effect, is to offer them as credits
against tax, which reduce tax liability dollar for dollar.' 5 5 Under this
framework, regardless of which tax bracket the taxpayer is in, the dollar
benefit is the same, as long as the taxpayer's income does not exceed
that allowed by the tax provision. In contrast, a tax credit is only
beneficial if the taxpayer's tax liability is sufficient to utilize the

146.

SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 108, at 100-01.

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 108.
Id.
See Surrey, supra note 92, at 716.
See id. at 717-18.
See id.
See id.
SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 108, at 106.
See Surrey, supra note 92, at 718.
SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 108, at 108.
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credit.' 5 6 Drafters of the adoption tax credit attempted to curtail this
result by allowing the taxpayer to carry forward any unused portion of
the credit.' 57 However, taxpayers in the lowest marginal brackets are
unlikely to have enough tax liability to receive the full credit, even if
they are allowed to carry it forward. Because lower income groups
adopt a greater percentage of foster children than higher income groups,
this is a large barrier to providing financial assistance to individuals
adopting foster children.'s
Structuring the adoption tax credit as a refundable credit can remove
this obstacle. The taxpayer would receive the full credit regardless of
tax liability, thus in effect making the credit the equivalent of a direct
grant to the taxpayer. While other direct assistance, such as access to
free support services, could also eliminate barriers, a cash payment
affords maximum flexibility for adoptive families. Flexibility and
individual choice are necessary components of a successful program
because the needs of foster children vary greatly.159
A potential drawback to a refundable credit is its cost. Refundability
results in greater accessibility to the tax credit, making it more costly to
the government. However, this lost revenue is necessary to further the
congressional goal of increasing the adoption of children from foster
care by offsetting the cost. Because foster children are
disproportionately adopted by lower income taxpayers, accessibility to
the full amount of the credit without the necessary tax liability is
warranted. In addition, increased adoptions from foster care have the
potential to reduce the amount of government spending directed toward
the foster care system.
Another drawback is the negative policy implication of "paying"
individuals to adopt. While transforming the credit into a refundable
credit ensures accessibility to the full amount of the credit, such an
approach also amplifies policy concerns associated with "paying"
families to adopt from the foster care system. Children are not likely to
benefit when placed with parents whose primary motivation is a cash
payment by the government. However, the amount of the one-time
credit is undoubtedly small compared to the actual cost of raising a
child. Further, all of the state safeguards in place to ensure children are
156. Id. at 109.
157. I.R.C. § 23(c) (2009).
158. GREEN, supra note 32, at 2.
159. According to Surrey, government assistance in the form of a refundable tax credit is
equivalent to a direct spending program. SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 108, at 111. Surrey
would argue that the credit should be included in the taxpayer's income. If not, an additional tax
expenditure arises, and the credit will have the same upside-down effect as a deduction or
exclusion. See Surrey, supra note 92, at 723. To enhance the distributional fairness of the credit,
the amount should be included in recipients' taxable income. Because the tax liability of lowincome taxpayers is small, inclusion of the credit should not have a significant deterrent effect.
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adopted into secure homes, such as investigative home studies,
background examinations, and personal interviews, would remain
intact.16 0
D. Elimination of the Creditfor Adoptions Other than Special
Needs Adoptions
Another policy alternative is to eliminate the credit entirely for
private adoptions. Although one goal of EGTRRA was to "encourage
more adoptions and allow more families to afford adoption,"' 6' the
policy justification for subsidizing private adoptions is seemingly
weaker than for promoting adoptions of special needs children,
including those in foster care. On average, parents adopting through
private and foreign adoptions have higher incomes than families
adopting foster children, and, as noted above, two-thirds of the total
dollars spent on the tax credit in 2005 were received by taxpayers with
incomes of $75,000 or greater.' 62 If the goal of the credit is to promote
adoptions by making them more affordable, giving the benefit to highincome taxpayers who presumably already have the ability to pay
makes little sense.' 6 3
Using tax dollars to pay individuals to engage in behaviors that they
would engage in without such an incentive is unpalatable, and it raises
the question of whether the credit should be discontinued for adoptions
other than those of special needs children. However, this policy choice
disregards the importance lawmakers have placed on promoting the
rearing of children who will grow up to become taxpayers. It also
160. An additional issue concerns the nature of the tax credit for private and foreign
adoptions, and whether the credit for these types of adoptions should also be refundable. A
uniform refundable credit for all adoption types would lessen any potential administrative
burden and also protect against criticism by those only seeking to adopt privately. Further,
private and foreign adoptions currently constitute over 80% of adoptions supported by the tax
credit and account for a grossly disproportionate number of adoption credit recipients; thus, the
majority of families adopting privately are already utilizing the credit, and the additional cost of
making the credit refundable for these types of adoptions would be small. See GREEN, supra
note 32, at 2 fig. 1. However, the reporting requirements should remain in effect for private and
foreign adoptions; most of the expenses related to private adoptions are easily recorded, and
individuals adopting through private organizations do not face the same reporting problems as
adoptive parents of foster children. See H.R. REP. No. 107-064, at 13 (2001). Individuals
participating in private adoptions can therefore more easily provide the documentation required
to obtain the credit.
161. H.R. REP. No. 107-064, at 5 (2001).
162.

GREEN, supra note 32, at 1.

163. Further, waiting lines for domestic private adoptions can be years in length, and
foreign adoptions are becoming more popular, with waiting periods well exceeding a year in
length. Id. at 4. Thus, the policy rationale of securing a home for waiting children does not seem
to support subsidizing these adoptions, as the children are not the ones waiting.
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overlooks the inability of some would-be parents to have children of
their own.
If the costs of adoption were identical to those of childbirth, then
continuing to subsidize adoption to a greater extent than childbirth
would be unreasonable; after all, adoptive parents receive the same tax
benefits as parents of natural children, including the child tax credit and
dependency exemption.164 But adoption costs are generally higher than
those of childbirth.
Private adoptions, whether domestic or foreign, can range in cost
from $5,000-$70 000, the bulk which goes toward registration and
attorney's fees.169 In contrast, although the overall average cost of an
uncomplicated childbirth in the United States is $8,802, the average
amount actually paid out-of-pocket for traditional delivery is $463, and
Cesarean sections average $523 (insurance and hospital discount
agreements generally cover the balance of the costs).16 The adoption
credit recognizes this disparity and attempts to compensate for the
difference.
While some argue that the Code already tolerates numerous
disparities and inequities, many features of the Code, including its
progressive rate structure, demonstrate the government's commitment
to a certain leveling of the playing field. This seems to be a constructive
recognition of, and effort to reduce, certain unavoidable inequalities
inherent in any society. Thus, continuing the accessibility of the credit
for private and foreign adoptions appears a reasonable choice.
However, reducing the phase-out range for the credit may be a
practical policy alternative. The 2009 phase-out range begins for
taxpayers with AGIs in excess of $182,180, and the credit is completely
phased out for taxpayers with AGIs of $222,180 or more.16
Policymakers could revert the phase-out to the pre-EGTRRA, SBJPA
164.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 501 (2009), available at http://www.irs.

gov/publications/p501/ar2.html#enUS_publinkl000220868.
165. Adoption Costs, available at http://www.adoptionservices.org/adoption/adoption
costs.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
166.

THOMSON HEALTHCARE, THOMSON REPORT: THE HEALTHCARE COSTS OF HAVING A

BABY (2007), at 1, 7 fig. 1 (2007), available at http://www.Marchofdimes.com/files/Thomson.
pdf
167. Interestingly, the Code does not treat fertility procedures to overcome an inability to
have children similarly. The Code does not allow a credit, but only a deduction for medical
expenses related to fertility procedures, and the deduction is only for the amount of expenses
greater than 7.5% of the taxpayer's AGI. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 502

(2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p502/arO2.html#en-US_publinkl0001
78856. This difference in treatment may be related to the policy goal of placing children with
families; offsetting the costs of fertility procedures does not seem to positively affect the
placement of existing children in family settings.
168. See I.R.C. § 23(b)(2)(A) (2009).
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range: beginning at an AGI of $75,000 and completely phasing out for
an AGI of $115,000 or more.' 69 This reduction could also help offset
the cost of a refundable credit.
V. CONCLUSION
The adoption tax credit was designed to further two congressional
objectives: to reduce financial barriers to all adoptions and to encourage
the adoption of special needs children, such as those in the foster care
system. Unfortunately, the adoption credit of I.R.C. § 23 is expensive
and has been unsuccessful at achieving the congressional goal of
promoting adoptions from foster care.
For the credit to successfully incentivize foster care adoptions, it
must be structured in a way that it is accessible to lower-income
taxpayers who do not have the requisite tax liability to claim the credit.
This can be achieved by transforming the current credit into a
refundable credit. With the sunset date quickly approaching, Congress
must determine whether it should continue to allow millions in forgone
revenue without the corresponding desired result, or whether it should
consider implementing new spending alternatives that would effectively
promote its objectives.
VI. ADDENDUM

Before publication of this Note, Congress passed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Health Care Act).' 7 o Although
focused primarily on expanding access to affordable health care, the
Health Care Act also addressed the adoption tax credit, increasing the
maximum amount of the credit to $13,170.
Most importantly, the
Health Care Act makes the credit refundable and moves the credit from
I.R.C. § 23 to I.R.C. § 36C, a subpart relating to refundable credits.172
Thus, for the first time, adoptive families unable to previously utilize
the credit will receive a cash refund from the government for their
adoption expenses. On this point, Surrey would likely be proud of our
policymakers.
While this change is laudable, the new provision is temporary, and
169.

See Small Business Job Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-188,

1899 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671, 674, 1996b (1996)).

§ 1807, 110 Stat. 1755,

170. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10909, 124 Stat.
119(2010).
171. Id. § 10909, 124 Stat. at 1021. Changes are effective for tax years beginning after
December 31, 2009. The credit is now found at 26 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2010). Id. at 1024.
172. Id. at 1022.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

226

[Vol. 21

the Health Care Act merely delays EGTRRA's sunset date with respect
to the credit by one year, until December 2011.173 Thus, unless
Congress again extends the sunset date or makes EGTRRA and the
Health Care Act's amendments permanent, the adoption credit will
revert to its pre-EGTRRA provisions.1 74 As adoptive families celebrate
the new Health Care Act, they may momentarily forget the looming
sunset date, but policymakers must keep in mind the thousands of
children waiting for a permanent solution.

173.
174.

Id. at 1023.
Id.

